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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
MARY HATHAWAY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

JAY L. MARX, FLOYD A. MARX, d/b/a
CARBON ANIMAL BY-PRODUCTS
COMPANY, and LUEY HADDOCK,

Case No.
11030

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the owner-driver of an automobile for injuries arising out of an automobile accident which occurred June 27, 196t at approximately 11 :30 A.M. o'clock, on Highway 40. A collision
occurred in a rural area at a dirt cross road as appellant attempted to pass respondent's truck.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Joseph
P. Nelson, sitting with a jury. The jury brought in a
verdict of no cause of action. The Court instructed
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the jury that the dirt road turnoff was an intersection.
The jury apparently predicated its verdict upon appellant's contributory negligence in passing within
100 feet of an intersection.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of
the lower court as a matter of law upon the grounds
that the Court erred in instructing the jury that the
site of the accident was at an intersection within the
meaning of the statutes of Utah; that passing within
100 feet of an intersection was unlawful. There was
also irregularity on the part of a juror who stated to
his fellows in the jury room material facts based on
personal knowledge concerning material issues in
the case which were not adduced in evidence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was driving west on Highway 40, approximately 10 miles west of Roosevelt, Utah, on the
27th day of June, 1961, at approximately 11:30
o'clock A.M. The weather was clear and visibility
was good. Highway 40, at the location of the accident, is relatively straight, and as the Highway approache·s the dirt road turnoff from the east, there
is a slight descent. About one-half mile to the east
of the dirt road, Lake Boren turnoff, there is a crest
of a hill so that a motorist traveling westerly is not
able to observe the dirt road turnoff until driving
over the crest of the hill and on the descent described. Once over the crest of the hill, Highway 40

cctn be observed for a considerable distance beyond
the dirt road turnoff. The Lake Boren turnoff from
Highway 40 for a motorist traveling west, as appellant was traveling in this case, is a paved roadway
to the north, or to the right, and to the south, or left,
there is a dirt road. Exhibit P.5 clearly shows the dirt
road described. and Exhibit P. 4 shows the Lake
Boren Road.
The testimony is uncontradicted that there were
no highway signs, painted lines on the highway, or
any marking of any kind to notify a motorist of an
intersection at the dirt road turnoff (R. 16, 33). The
dirt road, to the south, was sparsely traveled (R. 1819). The Lake Boren Road was more frequently
traveled than the dirt road, particularly during fishing season (R. 23).
Highway 40 on each side of the dirt road-Lake
Boren Road is widened with marked lanes for acceleration as shown in Exhibits P. 2, P. 3, and P. 4.
Appellant testified that as she approached defendant's truck from the rear there was no other traffic on the highway, and that she proceeded to pass
defendant's truck which was moving at a slow rate of
speed. Defendant's truck made no visible signals to
indicate a left hand turn as both vehicles approached
the vicinity of the dirt road turnoff and appellant
was not aware of an intersection. Officer Harrington, state trooper, who investigated the accident,
testified that the turn signals on the truck did not
work (R. 21), and further, that if they did, they would
not be visible because they were covered with dirt

22). Appellant proceeded to pass defendants
truck, and simultaneously defendant Haddock
turned the direction of the truck to make a turn onto
the dirt road. The vehicles came to rest in the proximate position shown in Exhibits P. 1, 2, and 3.
(R.

Instruction 16 (R. 45) of the trial court stated the
following:
"No vehicle shall at anv time be driven to the left
side of the road when .. ·. approaching within 100 feet
or on traversing any intersection".

The trial court defined contributory negligence,
then continued in Instruction No. 5, Proposition II
l(b) (R. 37);

"Plaintiff attempted to pass to the left of a vehicle
at an intersection when it was unlawful to do so"
(R. 37).

The appellant objected to the Court giving instructions No. 5 and 16 (R. 165).
POINT ONE
THE DIRT ROAD TURNOFF AT THE ACCIDENT
SCENE WAS NOT AN INTERSECTION WITHIN THE
MEANING AND CONTEMPLATED CONSTRUCTION
OF SECTION 41-6-58 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
WHICH PROHIBITS DRIVING ON THE LEFT SIDE OF
A ROAD WITHIN 100 FEET OR ON TRAVERSING AN
INTERSECTION.

An intersection is defined in our Motor Vehicle
Code as follows:
"Section 41-6-8, Intersection - Crosswalk - Safety
zone, Business, Residence, and Urban Districts (a)

"Intersection". (1) The area embraced within the
prolongation or connection of the lateral curblines,
or if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the
roadways of two highways which join one another at,
or approximately at, right angles, or the area within
~~i~h vehicles traveling upon different highways
JOmmg at any other angle come in conflict."

A Highway is defined as follows:
"Section 41-6-7. Streets, highways, and roads and
portions thereof (a) Street or Highway. The entire
width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the
use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel ... "

The State Road Commission has the authority
and obligation to place highway traffic control devices and signs. Section 41-6-20 UCA vests that right
with the State Road Commission and directs it to
adopt a manual and specifications for a uniform
system of traffic-control devices consistent with the
provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act. Section 41-6-21
provides as follows:
"Section 41-6-21. Placing and maintenance upon state
highways. (a) The State Road Commission shall place
and maintain such traffic-control devices in conformance with its manual and specifications upon all state
highways as it shall deem necessary to indicate and
to carry out the provisions of this act or to regulate,
warn or guide traffic." (Emphasis added.)

The evidence is uncontradicted that the State
Highway Commission did not place any control to
regulate, warn, or guide traffic traveling on Highway 40 as that Highway approached the dirt road-

Lake Boren turnoff that an intersection existed. In
fact, a motorist passing as appellant did in this case.
would only see the dirt road to the left of the highway which would appear as another farm lane.
A double painted line did not warn a motorist
that he could not travel to the left hand side of the
highway. In the instant case Exhibits P. 3 and P. 4
clearly show that a broken white stripe indicating
the middle of the highway was the only marking
on the highway. Such a marking did not prohibit
passing or traveling to the left hand side of a highway. There were not regulatory signs indicating that
the dirt road-Lake Boren turnoff existed or that an
intersection even existed. Obviously, the State Road
Commission did not classify the dirt road-Lake Boren
turnoff as an intersection, for it did not use its authority to notify the public of its existence.
The Utah State Road Commission has adopted a
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for
Streets and Highways/I published by the United
States Department of Commerce. This manual, so
far as it pertains to no passing zones and intersections, provides a!:? follows:
Section C (p. 53) of the Manual provides for the
use of warning signs. Section K-10, Cross Road Sign
I/Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Division for Streets and Highways,
prepared by the National Joint Committee on Uniform Traffic Control
Devices; American Association of Highway Officials, Institute of Traffic
Engineers, National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances,
National Association of County Officials, and American Municipal Association, herein referred to as the "Manual".

(W 2-1) (P. 60) provides:
"The Cross Road sign, showing a vertical cross symbol, shall be erected on a through highway to indi~ate
the presence of a cross road. I ts use should be restricted to intersections with roads that are improved to
such an extent that there is likely to be a fairly large
volume of traffic entering or crossing the through
route and where poor sight distance or obscured entrances make it advisable that the intersection be
called to the motorists's attention. It should not
ordinarily be used where Junction signs (sec. lD-13)
or Advance Turn Arrows (sec. lD-15) are present.
Cross Road signs should not be erected at unimproved
intersecting roads. Too frequent use of the Cross
Road sign should be avoided."

Part II, "Markings" in the Manual provides under 2A-4 "Types of Markings" (P. 114):
"Markings as defined for the purpose of this manual
are of a number of types:
1. Pavement Markings:

(c) No-passing zone markings (Sec. 2B 7
to 10)".

"2B-8 No Passing Zones Markings (P. 123) provides:
"A no-passing zone shall be marked by a solid ba~rier
line placed as the right-hand eleme~t of a ?ombm.ation line along the center or lane lme. This barner
line shall be yellow.
The barrier line shall be not less than 4 nor
more than 6 inches wide, and shall be separated
from the adjacent line by a space of not less than 3
nor more than 4 inches."

"2B-9 Application of No-Passing Zones Markings" (P. 123) states:
"On a two-lane highway the combination no-passing
line shall follow the center line throughout the nopassing zone ... In no case shall the marking be less
than 500 feet in length. If the actual no-passing distance is less than 500 feet, the additional length of
marking shall be added at the beginning of the zone
... The no-passing barrier line is also used on twoway roadways at pavement-width transitions (sec.
2B-14) and on approaches to obstructions which must
be passed on the right (sec. 2B-18). It may also be
used on approaches to intersections."

The physical facts are that Highway 40 is wider
on each side of the Lake Boren turnoff, but this
would not alert a motorist of its being an intersection, for Highway 40 between Soldiers Summit and
the Colorado border is widened and narrowed repeatedly with and without markings.
This court has had occasion to consider a similar physical fact situation as the dirt road-Lake Boren
turnoff in Douglas v. Giganden (1958) 332 Pac. 2d
932, 8 Utah 2d 245. That case involved a motorist
who commenced passing a pickup truck who's
driver, without warning, commenced to make a left
hand tum onto Peters Point Road. There were no
highway markings to prohibit passing or were there
any regulatory signs indicating the intersection of
Peters Point Ro3.d with the main highway. This
Court rightly held that Peters Point Road was not
an intersection within the meaning of our statutes.
The same test applies here. The State Road Com-

'.::1

mission m both situations did not prohibit passing
by establishing no-passing zones either through the
use of painted markings on the highway or regulatory signs pursuant to its Manual. A traveler using
Highway 40 in the vicinity of the dirt road-Lake
Boren turnoff would not know the purported intersection by reason of its physical location, i.e. a dirt
road cross secting the main highway in a farming
community. The State Road Commission would
have marked the intersection if in fact it was one.
As a matter of law, an intersection did not exist and
the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the
law concerning intersections.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
THE JURY THAT IT WAS UNLAWFUL FOR APPELLANT TO PASS TO THE LEFT OF A VEHICLE AT AN
INTERSECTION.

The Trial Court charged that appellant would
be guilty of contributory negligence in Instruction
No. 5, Proposition 1 B, to-wit:
"Plaintiff attempted to pass to the left of a vehicle
at an intersection when it was not lawful to do so"
(R. 37).

This error was further developed in Instruction
No. 16 when the Trial Court instructed as follows:
"The laws of the state provide ... no vehicle at any
time should drive to the left side of the road way
when approaching ... within 100 feet or on traversing any intersection ... "

.I.\)

The dirt road turnoff that defendant's truck was
turning into simply was not an intersection within
the contemplation of Section 41-6-8 UCA 1953 and
was not recognized as such by the State Road Commission for the reasons set forth in Point I, as a matter of law, the above instructions were erronious.
POINT THREE
APPELLANT WAS PRECLUDED FROM HAVING A
FAIR TRIAL WHEN A JUROR WITHHELD FROM THE
COURT HIS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACCIDENT BY REASON OF HAPPENING UPON THE
SCENE IMMEDIATELY AFTER ITS OCCURRENCE
AND SO TESTIFIED TO HIS FELLOW JURORS ON
MATERIAL FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE IN THE JURY
ROOM.

The jury foreman advised counsel for respondent that he happened upon the scene of the accident shortly after its occurrence, and observed
Stansfield there and so advised the jury in the jury
room. The jury foreman did not advise the Court of
his presence at the scene of the accident shortly
after it occurred.
Mr. Stansfield, a prospective juror was challenged for cause during the impanelling of the jury
and was excused by the Court. Though the court
reporter did not record the testimony, counsel for respondent will agree that Mr. Stansfield knew defendants, was their business associate, and a long
time personal friend of defendant Haddock; for these
relationships, the trial judge granted appellant's
counsel challenge for cause.
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Mr. Stansfield remained in the courtroom and
took the stand on respondents behalf, testifying that
he observed the accident by reason of his position
as he traveled west on Highway 40 behind appellant. Further, his testimony was contradictory to
Trooper Harrington, for he said the signal lights of
defendant's vehicle were working and in fact were
blinking, indicating a left hand turn just prior to the
accident. Upon cross examination it was brought out
not only did Mr. Stansfield have a business acquaintance with respondents, but he had a firm opinion
that appellant was responsible for the accident originating, supposedly . from his first hand observation
of the accident which he withheld from the Court
while he was under consideration as a juror (R. 127).
The jury foreman failed to acknowledge upon
inquiry by the trial court that he had been at the
scene of the accident. The jury foreman told his fellow jurors that he happened upon the scene of the
accident shortly after it happened and Mr. Stansfield was present. He knew that Stansfield was telling the truth concerning the left hand turn signals
of defendant's truck and that they were properly
working. It was material for the jury foreman to
acknowledge that he had been at the scene of the
accident shortly after its occurrence, for questions
could have been put to him as to whether or not he
had a preformed opinion concerning the accident
and its cause as did Mr. Stansfield (R. 127). The jury
foreman stating to his fellows in the jury room that
he had been present at the accident and seen Mr.
Stansfield was a material fact based upon personal

